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Abstract
To adhere with Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, Indonesia enacted
regulations concerning Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting
(CbCR) to address the issue of tax avoidance. Those regulations introduced the requirement
of CbCR in Indonesia, where Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in Indonesia are
required to provide tax authorities with geographic breakdown of their profitability, tax
payments, and activities wherever they operate. Using the newly implemented CbCR in
Indonesia as a treatment for private disclosure requirement, this study examines the effect of
CbCR on MNEs tax avoidance. Employing EUR 750 million consolidated revenue threshold
for disclosure and utilizing regression discontinuity design as well as difference-in-differences
analysis, we document a 4-8 percentage point increase in effective tax rates among affected
MNEs, thus reflecting a decrease in tax avoidance in treatment firms. Our findings contribute
(i) to the recent empirical literature on how CbCR as a private disclosure affects corporate
tax avoidance behavior and (ii) to the policy evaluation whether CbCR regulation has
achieved its objective.
Keywords: Transfer Pricing; Country-by-Country Reporting; private disclosure; corporate
taxation; tax avoidance

Abstrak
Untuk memenuhi Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Aksi 13, Indonesia menerbitkan
peraturan mengenai Dokumentasi Penentuan Harga Transfer dan mengenai Laporan per
Negara (CbCR). Peraturan-peraturan tersebut memperkenalkan kewajiban pelaporan CbCR
di Indonesia, di mana perusahaan multinasional yang beroperasi di Indonesia diwajibkan
untuk memberikan rincian geografis mengenai profitabilitas, pembayaran pajak, dan
aktivitas mereka di manapun mereka beroperasi kepada otoritas pajak. Dengan
menggunakan CbCR yang baru diimplementasikan di Indonesia sebagai bentuk perlakuan
bagi persyaratan pengungkapan privat, penelitian ini menguji pengaruh CbCR pada
penghindaran pajak Perusahaan Multinasional (MNE). Dengan menggunakan batasan
peredaran bruto konsolidasi sebesar EUR 750 juta untuk pengungkapan dan analisis
regression discontinuity design serta difference-in-differences, kami membuktikan adanya
peningkatan sebesar 4-8 persen dalam tarif pajak efektif di antara MNE yang terdampak
kewajiban CbCR, yang menggambarkan penurunan penghindaran pajak pada perusahaan
yang memperoleh perlakuan. Temuan kami berkontribusi (i) pada literatur empiris terbaru
tentang bagaimana CbCR sebagai pengungkapan privat memengaruhi perilaku penghindaran
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pajak perusahaan dan (ii) pada evaluasi kebijakan apakah peraturan CbCR telah mencapai
tujuannya.
Kata kunci: Transfer Pricing; Laporan per Negara; pengungkapan privat; pajak
perusahaan; penghindaran pajak

INTRODUCTION
By enacting Minister of Finance
Regulation No. 213/PMK.03/2016 (MoFR213/2016) concerning Transfer Pricing
Documentation and Director General of
Taxes Regulation No. 29/PJ/2017 (DGTR29/2017) concerning Procedures for
Managing Country-by-Country Reporting
(CbCR)1, Indonesia adopts three-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation
consistent with Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) Action 132. The threetiered structure consists of (i) master file,
containing information relevant for all Multinational Enterprise (MNE) group members; (ii) local file, describing specifically to
related party transactions conducted by the
local taxpayer as part of MNE group; and
(iii) CbCR, containing standardized information relating to the global allocation of
the MNE’s income and taxes paid along
with certain indicators of economic activity
where the MNE operates (OECD 2015).
Those three documents are expected to improve the taxpayer’s transparency for tax
administration and finally help tax administration in tackling tax avoidance of the
MNEs (OECD 2015).
Under BEPS Action 13, MoFR213/2016 and DGTR-29/2017, MNEs are
required to submit annual CbCR to tax administrations through their Ultimate Parent
Entities (UPEs). The aforementioned report
1

Transfer Pricing Documentation in Minister of
Finance Regulation No. 213/PMK.03/2016 consists
of three documents, i.e. Master File, Local File, and
Country-by-Country Reporting. The enactment of
Director General of Taxes Regulation No.
29/PJ/2017 is only for clarifying the technical
guidance on Country-by-Country per se.
2
BEPS Action 13 is one of 15 Action Plans proposed
by the OECD to address the issue of Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) exploited by MNEs.
There are several BEPS Action Plans falling within
the category of minimum standards, i.e. BEPS

contained aggregated data for each jurisdiction where MNEs operate world-wide, including information on revenue, profit or
loss before income tax, income tax paid, income tax accrued, stated capital, retained
earnings, the number of employees, tangible assets, and lists of constituent entities3
for each jurisdiction and their activities
(OECD 2015).
The CbCR obtained by tax administration from UPE of particular MNE
group will then be exchanged with the other
jurisdictions where the MNE group
operates (OECD 2015). The availability of
CbCR of MNE group and the exchange of
the report to any jurisdiction where the
MNE operates would close the information
gap between MNE and tax administration,
and even between tax administrations
(OECD 2015). This is intended to enhance
the capacity of tax risk assessment to better
allocate the audit resource, and thus to deter
aggressive tax planning (OECD 2017).
CbCR as required by BEPS Action
13, MoFR-213/2016, and DGTR-29/2017 is
intended as a private disclosure. The nature
as a private disclosure is in the sense that
CbCR is only reported to the tax authority,
yet not published to the society (Simone and
Olbert 2020). It thus differs from CbCR as
a public disclosure which should be made
publicly available as required by European
Union (EU) Capital Requirements Directive
IV (CRD IV) for EU banking industry.
Action 5 (Counter Harmful Tax Practices), BEPS
Action 6 (Prevent Treaty Abuse), BEPS Action 13
(Country-by-Country Report), and BEPS Action 14
(Improving Effectiveness of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms). As part of Inclusive Framework
member countries, Indonesia is thus obliged to
implement those minimum standards, including
Country-by-Country Report.
3
The scope of constituent entities pursuant to BEPS
Action 13 and DGTR-29/2017 encompasses
subsidiaries and Permanent Establishments (PEs)
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There have been ample researches examining how the impact of the introduction
of CbCR requirement as public disclosure
to corporate behavior through public accountability, for instance Dutt et al. (2019);
Brown et al. (2019); Joshi et al. (2019);
Overesch and Wolff (2019). However, there
is still limited research studying the impact
of CbCR as a private disclosure on corporate tax avoidance, except for Joshi (2020).
Nevertheless, Joshi (2020) limits its studies
solely on the behavior of EU MNE’s Ultimate Parent Entity post the implementation
of CbCR as private disclosure therein. It
does not accordingly describe the whole
picture of corporate tax avoidance from the
perspective of capital importing countries
where most of the subsidiaries of MNEs reside.
The effectiveness of private disclosure in addressing the problem of corporate
tax avoidance will rely on its informativeness for tax authority in tax law enforcement. OECD (2015) claims that CbCR will
provide the tax administration with a new
information on MNE’s global footprints,
activities, and the related tax payments in
the other jurisdictions. Pawar and
Sabharwal (2016) described that before the
implementation of CbCR, how tax administrations perceive an MNE group was akin
to a group of blind men attempting to identify what an elephant looks like. With the
information contained in CbCR, tax administrations are expected to comprehend a
whole picture of how MNEs actually
operate world-wide.
However, Hanlon (2018) and Spengel
(2018) doubt this claim by pointing out that
CbCR might be unable to assess whether
the transfer pricing of the MNEs has been
set appropriately and that heterogeneity of
information in CbCR may dilute its informativeness. Accordingly, the effectiveness of CbCR in strengthening tax law enforcement and thus reducing corporate tax
avoidance of MNEs is still questionable.

This study is aimed to answer such a
puzzle by examining whether there are any
differences in corporate tax avoidance of
MNEs in Indonesia before and after CbCR
regulation. To empirically test it, we employ a regression discontinuity design and
difference-in-differences analysis. In this
study, our observation consists of MNEs
operating in Indonesia irrespective where
their UPEs reside. Furthermore, to separate
the observation into treatment group and
control group, we employ the consolidated
revenue threshold as set out by BEPS Action 13. MNEs operating in Indonesia of the
UPEs having consolidated revenue equal to
or higher than EUR 750 million are treated
as treatment group, otherwise – MNEs in
Indonesia of the UPEs having consolidated
revenue below EUR 750 million are treated
as control group.
In this study, our main proxy for tax
avoidance is Effective Tax Rate (ETR). For
first analysis using firm-level regression
discontinuity design, we document a sharp,
positive, and significant discontinuity in tax
avoidance at the cutoff: MNEs operating in
Indonesia of the UPEs above CbCR threshold report higher ETRs, suggesting a decline in tax avoidance.
To support our first analysis, we also
employ difference-in-differences model.
There is a 4 to 8 percentage point increase
in the ETRs (equal to approximately EUR 6
million – EUR 11 million or IDR 103.2 billion to IDR 192.5 billion increase in tax expense) of reporting MNEs (treatment
group) post adoption of CbCR, relative to
non-reporting MNEs (control group)4.
These results solidly indicate that the implementation of CbCR in Indonesia lead to a
significant decline in corporate tax avoidance.
This study thus offers some contributions. First, we add to the existing literature
by providing empirical evidence of the impact of CbCR as a private disclosure re

4

https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=EUR&d
ate=2020-08-12

Assume the exchange rate of EUR to IDR =
17,463.13 (the EUR-IDR exchange rate on 12
August
2020
based
on:
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quirement that applies to all MNEs in Indonesia. Unlike the previous study carried out
by (Joshi 2020) which focuses solely on the
impact of CbCR on EU headquartered
MNEs, our study provides the impact of
CbCR on MNEs operating in Indonesia, irrespective where their UPEs reside,
considering the nature of Indonesia as a capital importing country. Our findings are
however consistent with Joshi (2020) and
even with higher magnitude of economic
consequences, in terms of higher increase in
the ETRs.
Second, this study provides the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) with a new
insight whether the adoption of CbCR as
mandated by BEPS Action 13 has achieved
the desired results, i.e. providing transparency and thus lowering the potential of
tax avoidance. There has not been any
empirical study examining the impact of
CbCR regulation on MNEs operating in
Indonesia. The result of this study is intended to fill the gap by answering the effectiveness of the introduction of CbCR
regulation in Indonesia.
The rest of this article consists of
several sections. Section 2 elaborates institutional background, literature review and
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. Section 4 reports our primary results and robustness check. Section 5 concludes this
study.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND,
LITERATURE REVIEW, AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Background: Country byCountry Reporting
BEPS Action 13, MoFR-213/2016, as
well as DGTR-29/2017 explain that CbCR
provides the aggregated data on jurisdiction/country basis where the MNE group
operates, consisting of the data of revenue
5

EUR 750,000,000 x 15,008.1816 = IDR
11,256,136,200,000  IDR 11,000,000,000,000. The

from both related parties and unrelated parties, profit/loss before income tax, income
tax paid, income tax accrued, stated capital,
accumulated
earnings,
number
of
employees, and tangible assets other than
cash and cash equivalents (OECD 2015).
Aside from the above, CbCR also provides
the information of the list of constituent entities located in each jurisdiction/country,
including the information of their respective
main business activities and any other relevant information encompassing all information described earlier.
Notwithstanding the first proposal by
Murphy (2003) requiring MNEs to publicly
disclose certain financial information for
every jurisdiction in which they operate, as
mandated by BEPS Action 13 CbCR data is
treated as confidential data, in which taxpayer as a UPE reports it directly to tax administration where it is administered without necessarily publishing it for society. Accordingly, it falls within the category of private disclosure. From information in CbCR,
tax administrations may obtain any additional insights which are useful in assessing
the tax risk (both transfer pricing risk and
other BEPS risk) of a particular MNE
(OECD 2017). Having a robust tax risk assessment, tax administrations may better
allocate its resources to MNEs posing
higher risk, and thus tackle the issue of corporate tax avoidance (OECD 2017).
BEPS Action 13 sets out the guideline
that CbCR is only required for MNE group
having consolidated group revenue of at
least EUR 750 million. To adhere with
BEPS Action 13, MoFR-213/2016 and
DGR-29/2017 stipulates that MNEs with
Indonesian UPEs are required to submit
CbCR if their consolidated group revenues
are at least IDR 11 trillion. This figure is actually equal with EUR 750 million based on
EUR-IDR exchange rate on 1 January
2015.5 Both regulations even further described that if the UPEs of the MNEs are
figure 15,008.1816 the EUR-IDR exchange rate on
1 January 2015 based on:
https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/historical/EUR/0
1_01_2015
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foreign entities, the threshold of consolidated group revenue will be EUR 750 million, following BEPS Action 13.
CbCRs are filed annually by the UPE
for the entire MNE group members in the
jurisdiction where UPE resides. To ensure
that all tax administrations where MNE
group operates obtain the same information,
the OECD developed the Qualifying Competent Authority Agreement (QCAA) to enable the exchange of CbCRs between tax
administrations, where tax administration
receiving the CbCR from UPE of a particular MNE group will transmit it to the other
jurisdictions where the constituent entities
of the MNE group operate. As of August
2020, Indonesia has 75 QCAAs in effective
with other jurisdictions to accommodate the
exchange of CbCR (OECD 2020).
Literature Review and Hypothesis
Development
Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined
an agency relationship as a contract under
which principal engage the agent to perform
services on behalf of the principal which is
followed by delegating decision making authority to the agent. If the interest of both
parties diverge, there is a possibility that the
agent will not always act in the best interests
of the principal. To address this agency
problems, the principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit
the deviation of agent.
The framework of the agency theory
can also be used to understand the corporate
tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).
Chen and Chu (2005), for instance, use principal-agent model in explaining the efficiency loss due to the incompleteness in
contract when a principal hires an agent to
engage in tax avoidance. Their study finds
that if a firm intends to avoid taxes, it has to
balance the tradeoff between two considerations, i.e. the increase of expected after-tax
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profit on one side, and the risk of being detected as well as the cost of efficiency loss
in internal control on the other side.
Another study of corporate tax avoidance within agency framework is Crocker
and Slemrod (2005). Crocker and Slemrod
(2005) examine corporate tax avoidance in
the context of the contractual relationship
between the corporate shareholders and a
tax manager of Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) possessing private information concerning the reductions in taxable income.
Their study finds a policy relevant result
that penalties imposed on the tax manager
are more effective in reducing tax avoidance than are those imposed on shareholders.
Further literature of agency theory in
explaining corporate tax behavior is Desai
et al. (2007). Desai et al. (2007) explain a
situation where a self-interested manager
structures a complex scheme to reduce corporate taxes and divert corporate resources
for manager’s private use. In this regard,
Desai et al. (2007) argue that a strong enforcement from tax authority can provide
additional monitoring of managers, and accordingly, the incentives of the outside
shareholders are aligned with the tax authority in reducing diversion by managers.
Corporate Tax Avoidance
In their seminal paper, Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) posit that individual tax
compliance is determined by tax rates, the
probability of detection and punishment,
penalties and risk-aversion. However,
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argued that
these factors also apply to the corporate taxpayer. Slemrod (2004) also points out, additional issues arise in corporations because
of the separation between ownership and
control. Separation of ownership and control thus can lead to corporate tax decisions
that reflect the private interests of the manager. However, within agency framework,
if tax avoidance is a worthwhile activity, the
owners should structure appropriate incentives to ensure that managers make tax-efficient decisions.
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Tax-efficient decisions could be understood from the Scholes and Wolfson
(1992) framework. In the Scholes and
Wolfson (1992) framework, effective tax
planning is defined as steps taken by a firm
to minimize its explicit tax burden. In this
regard, Scholes and Wolfson (1992) model
highlighted the importance of considering
all parties, all taxes, and all costs in evaluating tax planning decision. Those three
themes – all parties, all taxes and all costs –
provide a structure for tax management to
achieve organizational goals, such as profit
or wealth maximization (Shackelford and
Shevlin, 2011). Consistent with this view,
Dyreng et al. (2008) document that effective tax rates, as the most common measure
of tax avoidance, are a choice variable, suggesting that firms can strategically avoid
taxes over the long run.
Tax Disclosures
The existence of tax disclosures can
provide the transparency for tax authority to
reduce the asymmetrical information between tax authority and taxpayer and thus
enables tax authority to detect the aggressive tax planning. The theory of tax evasion
also predicts that taxpayer compliance will
increase with higher probability of detection (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). If the
disclosure to tax authority can increase the
probability of detection, any costs related to
arranging the aggressive tax planning will
also increase. This will eventually reduce
the level of corporate tax avoidance.
Sansing (1993) argues that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United
States will engage in information acquisition activities and, subject to budget constraints, will rely more heavily on information signals that are more informative for
the audit process. Through empirical study,
Mills (1998) documents that increase in taxrelated disclosures can help tax authorities
in decision making for allocating enforcement resources. Consistent with Mills
(1998), Hoopes et al. (2012) also find that
U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive

tax positions when tax enforcement is
stricter.
Nevertheless, Towery (2017) documents that US firms did not alter their tax
behavior after being required to report a
new information to IRS regarding Uncertain Tax Positions (UTP). In this study,
Towery (2017) does not take into account
for the informativeness of the disclosure.
Bozanic et al. (2016) recently examine how public and private disclosure requirements influence tax enforcement in the
United States. Using IRS acquisition of a
firm’s public financial disclosures as a
proxy for IRS attention, they find that the
attention increased following an increase in
the public tax disclosure requirements (e.g.
Financial Accounting Standard Board Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes). However, they also
document that the attention decreases following an increase in private tax disclosure
requirements (e.g. uncertain tax benefits).
Considering this result, Bozanic et al.
(2016) argue on the informativeness of the
disclosure. Private disclosures will only be
useful to tax authorities insofar as they provide new information on an entity’s tax arrangement (Bozanic et al. 2016).
Further question may arise, whether
CbCR as a private disclosure can be informative enough for tax authorities to increase enforcement and thus change corporate tax behavior. Considering that the information contained in CbCR is global and
aggregate in nature, it is still unclear
whether CbCR does provide incremental insights to tax authorities to assess the appropriateness MNE’s transfer price (Hanlon
2018). Spengel (2018) also argued that the
heterogeneity of the reports resulting from a
lack of uniform implementation by different
companies and countries will dilute the
value of information contained in CbCR
and consequently lead to misinterpretation.
However, Joshi (2020) argue that
CbCR could provide the transparency for
tax authorities to detect any misalignment
between the profits generated in each country and the related tax payments. Moreover,

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Juni 2020, Vol. 17, No. 1, hal 59-83

not all tax authorities have a comprehensive
access to financial and tax information on
the MNE’s global operations. This could be
understood since CbCR provides the tax authority with a detailed breakdown of key operating, financial, activities, and tax metrics
for all jurisdictions where the MNE operates.
Joshi (2020) then conducts empirical
study to answer whether corporate tax
avoidance decreases following the implementation of CbCR as a private disclosure
in EU. Using EU headquartered MNEs as
the observation, she empirically documents
that there is a reduction in corporate tax
avoidance of EU MNEs following the implementation of CbCR as a private disclosure. The study also reveals that CbCR deters tax avoidance through the increase of
tax enforcement. This study is therefore
consistent with the argument that CbCR as
a private disclosure provides insightful information for tax authority thus strengthening tax enforcement and reducing corporate
tax behaviour.
Taking into account the above theoretical arguments and the previous studies,
including the empirical finding of Joshi
(2020) above, we therefore hypothesize
that:
H1: Corporate tax avoidance will
decrease following the implementation of CbCR.

6

Article 2 Paragraph 3 of MoFR-213/2016 indeed
provides provision on the obligation to submit CbCR
only for Indonesia-based UPE meeting the IDR 11
Trillion threshold on behalf of its group wherever the
group members operate. For foreign-based UPE, the
obligation to file CbCR will follow the regulation of
respective country where the UPE resides. However,
like MoFR-213/2016, CbCR regulation in any
countries shall also align with BEPS Action 13
minimum standard, including the EUR 750 million
threshold. In addition, Indonesia will also obtain the
CbCR of foreign-based UPE which has subsidiary
operating in Indonesia from the country of UPE
through automatic exchange of information
mechanisms, and vice versa. If due to some
conditions Indonesia cannot obtain the CbCR of
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RESEARCH METHODS
Data and Sample
Our primary sample consists of
MNEs operating in Indonesia. Unlike Joshi
(2020) which primarily focuses on the behavior of EU MNEs, i.e. EU-headquartered
firms, considering the nature of Indonesia
as a capital importing country, our main objective is to obtain evidence whether the implementation of CbCR affected tax avoidance on the MNEs operating in Indonesia,
irrespective where the UPEs reside.6
There are several reasons for selecting
Indonesia as the setting for this research.
First, until now, there has not been any empirical research studying the change of corporate tax behavior of MNEs operating in
Indonesia between prior and post the implementation of CbCR. Second, Indonesia has
been one of primary destinations for MNEs
through foreign direct investment in region
of South East Asia, thanks to its large market size and considerable number of labor
supply (Fernandez et al. 2020). Third, corporate tax avoidance has been a perennial
issues for tax administration of Indonesia.
Cobham and Jansky (2018) even estimated
that in 2013 Indonesia lost approximately
USD 6.48 billion to USD 7.48 due to
MNE’s corporate tax avoidance. This figure
made Indonesia as the second largest
developing countries suffering from tax
avoidance, after China. Taking the above
facts into consideration, this study then
focuses on the corporate tax behavior of
foreign-based UPE through automatic exchange of
information, Indonesia could still impose an
obligation for foreign-based MNE operating in
Indonesia to submit the CbCR of its group
employing EUR 750 million threshold. It is also
worth to mention that both the CbCR obtained from
Indonesia-based UPE and the CbCR received from
foreign-based UPE through the automatic exchange
of information with the other countries will then be
treated the same, i.e. as the input in assessing transfer
pricing risk and other tax avoidance risks of the
MNEs in Indonesia irrespective where the UPE
resides. Accordingly, the regulation will affect the
behaviour of Indonesia-based MNE and foreignbased MNE in the same way.
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Table 1
Sample Selection of MNEs Operating in Indonesia
Search Step
Active Companies
Country : Indonesia
Ownership : an Ultimate Owner or shareholder owning together 51% located anywhere (including
unknown countries); May have other shareholders located in country of origin; Subsidiaries located
anywhere (including unknown countries) not ultimately owned but at least 51% owned; May have
other shareholder in the foreign country; Def. of the UO: min. path of 50.01%. known or unknown
shareholder
Less firms missing required data i.e. Profit or Loss Before Tax, Tax Expense, Total Assets, Long
Term Debt, and Intangible Assets
Final sample

Step Results
283,923,475
107,625
17,649

17,556
93

Source: Orbis Database

MNEs operating in Indonesia and the
changes thereto due to the implementation
of CbCR.
The governing principle to determine
an MNE Group is to follow the accounting
consolidation rules (OECD 2019). Hence,
our sample should cover Indonesia-based
UPEs preparing consolidated financial
statements and any MNE subsidiaries being
consolidated by foreign based UPEs. IFRS
10 indeed defines the existence of control
when, one of which is power over the investee and holding majority of the voting rights
is sufficient to give power over the investee7. However, because our sample consists
of observations for the years 2010-2019 in
which there are observations where IFRS 10
is not yet in effect, for simplicity in determining holding majority of the voting
rights, we use the threshold as addressed in
the IAS 27, i.e. when the parent acquires
more than half of the voting rights of the entity. Joshi (2020) also uses such threshold
(i.e. ≥ 50% owned by the MNCs) in restricting the sample to majority-owned affiliates
with regard to income-shifting test. In addition to that, De Simone and Olbert (2019)
specify the consolidated firm as the parent
entity and each of its subsidiaries owned by
at least 50 percent directly by the parent or
by another, higher tier, subsidiary of the
same parent. Therefore, to ensure that our

sample consists of MNEs operating in
Indonesia, i.e. either Indonesian UPEs that
have foreign subsidiaries or subsidiaries in
Indonesia whose UPEs located in foreign
countries, we restrict the sample to active
companies companies with more than 50%
ownership or owned more than 50% by
other companies.
We compiled the data of those
companies, including the ownership data
and the annual financial statements for the
years 2010-2019 from Orbis database
(Bureau van Dijk). As abovementioned, to
separate our samples into treatment and
control group, we employ UPEs consolidated revenue. On the other hand, to
examine the tax avoidance behavior of our
samples, we use the unconsolidated financial statement data of our sample.
Despite being formally introduced by
the OECD through Final Report of BEPS
Action 13 in 2015, Indonesia had just set out
the requirement of CbCR since the
promulgation of MoFR-213/2016 in
December 2016. The details of CbCR requirement were then guided under DGTR29/2017 enacted in the following year.
However, both regulations stipulated that
the CbCR requirement has entered into
force since fiscal year commencing on 1
January 2016. We therefore consider the
post-implementation period to be from

7

majority of the members of the investee’s governing
body that directs the relevant activities are appointed
by a vote of the holder of the majority of the voting
rights. (IFRS 10.B35)

Holding majority of the Holding majority of the
voting rights is sufficient to give power over the
investee in the following situations : the relevant
activities of the investee are directed by a vote of the
holder of the majority of the voting rights; or a
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2016 onward. Following Joshi (2020), due
to the possibility for firms to take some time
to adjust their tax planning, we also estimate
the tax avoidance models by year.
Table 1 provides the steps taken to
obtain the sample of our study. After
excluding firms with missing data required
to calculate the regression variables, the
final sample consists of 93 MNEs operating
in Indonesia (930 firm year-ends). Table 1
presents an overview of the sample
selection.
Measures of Tax Avoidance
To measure tax avoidance, we employ Effective Tax Rate (ETR) consistent
with (Joshi 2020). A higher (positive) ETR
indicates a lower tax avoidance, and a lower
(negative) ETR suggests a higher tax avoidance. This measure has been extensively
used in previous studies and are appropriate
for the large sample of MNEs (Hanlon and
Heitzman 2010). As being pointed out by
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), the measures
of tax avoidance should carefully consider
the research question. Since our objective is
to observe MNEs’s tax avoidance behaviour resulted from intra-group transactions
both pre and post the era of CbCR, GAAP
ETR is considered to be capable of capturing such form of avoidance since another
tax strategy that defers taxes (e.g., more accelerated depreciation for tax purposes) will
not alter the GAAP ETR (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). To test the robustness of the
analysis we also employed the different
measure of tax avoidance using book tax
differences.8
ETR is calculated as the tax expense
divided by Pre-Tax Income (PTI)9. Following Joshi (2020), we also reset ETR at 0 and
1 to limit the influence of outliers and to be
able to better interpret the results.
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To identify the effect of CbCR on tax
avoidance, the first empirical strategy that
we use is a sharp regression discontinuity
design (Joshi 2020). The rating variable in
the regression discontinuity model is the
UPEs’ preceding year consolidated revenue
of the MNEs operating in Indonesia with the
EUR 750 million threshold as the cutoff and
the outcome variable is tax avoidance.
Consolidated revenue is expected to
be locally smooth across the threshold prior
the implementation period. However, tax
avoidance is expected to jump discontinuously at the EUR 750 million threshold
(Khan et al. 2017). To generate unbiased estimates of the treatment effect in a regression discontinuity design, index assignment
at the EUR 750 million threshold should be
locally randomized (Hahn et al. 2001). In
other words, the consolidated revenue shall
not be easily manipulated by the MNEs
(Joshi 2020). In this regard, manipulation of
consolidated revenue, though possible, is
uncommon for MNEs because they are required to alter the timing of revenue recognition, which can probably trigger further
scrutiny (Joshi 2020)
In addition to the graphical analysis
using binned scatterplot method, we also
carried out the nonparametric regression
discontinuity analysis to allow flexible
functional firms (Hahn et al. 2001; Lee and
Lemieux 2010; Tan 2013; Gao et al. 2016;
Khan et al. 2017). This nonparametric regression discontinuity is performed by nonparametric local linear regression using a
triangle kernel. Following the estimator of
Nadaraya (1964) and Watson (1964), we estimate the following model:

Research Methods
Regression Discontinuity Design

Where:
X: measured using ETR
Y: CBCR Variable, an indicator variable
1 for 2016 and subsequent years if

8

9

Following Hanlon (2005) we estimate total booktax differences by grossing up current tax expense by
statutory tax rate (25%)

We use the GAAP effective tax rate, the ratio of
total expense to pretax income that are disclosed in
the income statement, as explanined by Dyreng et
al. (2008)
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consolidated revenue of the UPEs in
the preceding taxation year was at
least EUR 750 million and zero otherwise.
H: the bandwidth option, we test the sensitivity of the results to the selected
bandwidth by re-estimating the biascorrected treatment coefﬁcient for
three other ﬁxed bandwidths (±250,
450, and 550).
K: (kernel) we use the triangle kernel
which is also used by Joshi (2020) to
analyze the impact of CbCR on tax
avoidance.
Difference-in-Differences Analysis
To identify the effect of CbCR on tax
avoidance, considering the lack of generalizability associated with regression discontinuity models, we also use difference-in-differences analysis. In this analysis, the treatment (control) group consists of all MNEs
operating in Indonesia whose UPEs have
consolidated revenue of at least (less than)
EUR 750 million in the preceding fiscal
year commencing from 2016 (Joshi 2020).
The use of EUR 750 million as a threshold
is consistent with both BEPS Action 13
Minimum Standard adopted globally and
MoFR-213/2016 as well as DGTR-29/2017
concerning CbCR.
We estimate the following baseline
model constructed by Joshi (2020) to test
for the impact of CbCR on tax avoidance.
TAit = α + β1 CBCRit + β2 POSTit + β3
POST x CBCRit + βXit + εit
TA is tax avoidance measured through
ETR. CBCR is an indicator variable equal
to 1 in 2010–2019 if the ﬁrm is subject to
CbCR requirement in 2016–2019 and 0
10

To implement a true difference-in-differences
design, we need to compare the pre- and post-tax
avoidance in treatment and control groups. As
illustrated by Joshi 2020, we classify ﬁrms with
consolidated revenue of more than EUR 750M in the
preceding taxation year (commencing in 2016) as
treatment ﬁrms for all periods (pre and post).
Therefore. we compare tax avoidance in ﬁrms above

otherwise.10 POST is an indicator variable
equal to 1 for all years in which the full
CBCR requirements were in effect (2016–
2019) and 0 otherwise (2010–2015). Xit is a
vector of control variables. Reasons for including control variables in above difference-in-differences model are for efficiency, checks for randomization, and adjusting for conditional randomization (Roberts and Whited 2013). Following Dyreng et
al. (2008); Hoopes et al. (2012); Donohoe
(2015); Chen (2017); Edwards et al. (2016),
we incorporate the following variables in
the model: proﬁtability (ROA), size
(LogTA), debt level (Leverage), intangible
assets (Intang), and R&D. Hoopes et al.
(2012) stated that including endogogenous
right-hand side variables as controls for factors that affect the budget set of the firm is
a common practice in accounting research.
In this regard, we employed control variables that affect the ability or incentives of
firms to practice tax avoidance and to clarify the CbCR variable on tax avoidance.11
ROA controls profitability, regardless of the
inconsistent results obtained for this variable based on prior researchs (e.g. Gupta and
Newberry 1997; Adhikari et al. 2006 in
Richardson et al. 2013). Size is applied to
controls size effect, previous researchs (e.g.
Tran 1997; Richardson and Lanis 2007;
Richardson et al. 2013) find that larger
firms are more likely to be tax aggressive
because they possess superior economic
and political power relative to smaller firms
(Siegfried 1972) and are able to reduce their
tax burdens accordingly. Leverage is utilized to control the incentives of firms to exercise tax avoidance due to tax-deductible
interest payments (Richardson et al. 2013).
Intang is used to control the effect of intangible asset accelerated depreciation charges
and below the EUR 750M cutoff before and after the
implementation of CbCR under BEPS Action 13.
11
The option of these control variables, i.e.
proﬁtability (ROA), size (LogTA), debt level
(Leverage), intangible assets (Intang), and R&D,
closely describe recent research on the determinant
of corporate tax avoidances (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2008;
Hoopes et al. 2012; Donohoe 2015; Chen 2017;
Edwards et al. 2016)
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Table 2
Industry Classification
Major Industry Sector

Freq.

Percent

Agriculture. Horticulture & Livestock

6

6%

Banking. Insurance & Financial Services

2

2%

Business Services
Chemicals. Petroleum. Rubber & Plastic
Communications
Construction

1

1%

15

16%

2

2%

3

3%

11

12%

Industrial. Electric & Electronic Machinery

1

1%

Leather. Stone. Clay & Glass products

3

3%

Media & Broadcasting

3

3%

Metals & Metal Products

8

9%

Mining & Extraction

6

6%

Miscellaneous Manufacturing

1

1%

Property Services

6

6%

Retail

5

5%

Textiles & Clothing Manufacturing

5

5%

Transport Manufacturing

2

2%

Transport. Freight & Storage

2

2%

Travel. Personal & Leisure

5

5%

Wholesale

2

2%

Food & Tobacco Manufacturing

Wood. Furniture & Paper Manufacturing
Grand Total

on tax avoidance, while R&D is associated
with tax avoidance owing to tax-deductible
R&D expenditure (Richardson et al. 2013).
To minimize the impact of potential
bias on the results from non-random treatment assignment, we use two multivariate
reweighting techniques to enhance the covariate balance between the treatment and
the control groups. We employ inverse
probability weighting and entropy balancing multivariate technique. The use of these
techniques reduces the potential bias due to
non-random treatment assignment and also
reduces model dependency for the subsequent analysis of treatment effects in the
pre-processed data using standard methods
such as regression analysis (Abadie and Imbens 2011).
In inverse probability weighting techniques, we use a weighted regression
model, where observations are weighted to
ensure similarity on some observed charac-

4

4%

93

100%

teristics (Joshi 2020). This approach is similar to the inverse probability of treatment
weighting and the ‘‘groups’’ to be weighted
reflect both treatment status as well as time
(pre-implementation vs. post-implementation) (Stuart et al. 2014). Specifically, we
follow (Stuart et al. 2014)’s weighting strategy that reweights the four groups (treatment pre, treatment post, control pre, and
control post) to be similar on a set of main
covariates which are leverage, size, return
on assets (ROA), intangible assets, and
profitability.
The second method we use is entropy
balancing which is based on a maximum entropy reweighting scheme that enables users
to fit weights that satisfy a potentially large
set of balance constraint involving exact
balance on the first, second, and possibly
higher moments of the covariate distributions in the treatment and the reweighted
control group (Hainmueller and Xu 2013).
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Variable
UPERev (mEuro)
PTI (mEuro)
Total Assets
(mEuro)
SIZE
ROA
LEVERAGE
ETR
INTANG
RND
Panel B
Variable
UPERev
(mEuro)
PTI (mEuro)
Total Assets
(mEuro)
SIZE
ROA
LEVERAGE
ETR
INTANG
RND

Treatment Group –MNCs Operating in Indonesia with UPE’s Consolidated
Revenue ≥ EUR 750 million
N
Mean
SD
P25
P50
P75
460
13,666.350
22,019.550
1,612.647
6,076.419
17,225.550
460
137.4377
325.0721
3.9599
19.9463
107.7260
460
1,334.228
2,662.798
107.675
437.075
1,558.527
460
460
460
460
460
460

8.690355
11.11137
0.1281959
0.2529504
0.022575
0.0038274

0.712921
15.48533
0.205296
0.1771401
0.0631617
0.0263739

8.115956
1.76750
0
0.1922743
0
0

8.735980
7.62750
0.0445404
0.2525055
0.0011545
0

9.261537
16.19300
0.1962982
0.2906412
0.0130285
0

470

152.8086

180.0229

20.8701

83.5416

207.5353

470
470

12.6557
260.2668

33.4086
414.0686

0.2134
33.3824

3.1601
103.0010

14.9537
313.3626

470
470
470
470
470
470

8.0852
4.4240
0.1146
0.2382
0.0134
0.0007

0.6405
9.4159
0.1460
0.2106
0.0638
0.0035

7.6078
0.6560
0.0001
0.1019
0
0

8.0970
4.5435
0.0488
0.2291
0
0

8.5753
9.4220
0.1873
0.2848
0.0010
0

All continuous variables are in millions of Euros. UPERev refers to the consolidated revenue for the corporate group; PTI
refers to pretax earnings at the ﬁrm level; Size refers to the natural log of total assets; ROA is the return on assets and is
calculated as net income divided by total assets; Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets; ETR is calculated as total
tax expenses divided by PTI; ETR has been reset at 1 and 0; INTANG is calculated as total intangible assets divided by total
assets; and RND is calculated by total R&D expenses divided by total assets.

We set the balancing constraints to the first
order of moment.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Summary and Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 describes sample firms by
industry based on NACE industry classification. Chemicals. Petroleum. Rubber and
Plastic Industries comprise 16% of the sample, followed by Food and Tobacco Manufacturing, which comprise 12%. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics separately for
MNEs based on UPEs’ consolidated revenue, between those of above (treatment) and
those of below (control) the EUR 750 million threshold. As we expect, firms in the

treatment group are larger and more
profitable. We also included mean
difference test to obtain initial evidence
whether there are any differences between
treatment and control group. Table 3
measures the t-test p-values of each variable
used in this study.
As shown in Table 4, there is no significant difference mean between treatment
and control group within Pre-CbCR implementation period. On the contrary, in the
Post-CbCR implementation period, there is
a significant difference mean between treatment and control group. This results may
provide preliminary evidence indicating
lower tax avoidance in ﬁrms subject to
CbCR following disclosure requirement.
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Table 4
Mean Different Test
p-Values
N
Treatment
Group
Control
Group

ETR

460

Pre-Implementation : 0.7852

470

Post-Implementation : 0.0348*

SIZE

ROA

LEVE
RAGE

INTAN
G

RND

0.0000*

0.0000*

0.2439

0.0280*

0.0114*

-1.5

-2

-1

0

-.5

ETR
2

ETR
0

.5

4

1

6

This table reports p-values each variables around the EUR 750M threshold. * Indicates statistical significance at 0.05.

-2000

0

2000
Consolidated Revenue

4000

Figure 1
Regression Discontinuity
Plot of Tax Avoidance
(Pre-Implementation Period)

-2000

0

2000
Consolidated Revenue

4000

Figure 2
Regression Discontinuity
Plot of Tax Avoidance
(Post-Implementation Period)

Source: Authors’ Calculation, STATA
Note:
Figure 1 plots ETRs against around the EUR 750M cutoff in the pre-implementation period (2010–2015). The vertical line is
centered on EUR 750M. We winsorized Consolidated Revenue since there are enormous differences in the distributional of the
data.
Figure 2 plots ETRs against around the EUR 750M cutoff in the post-implementation period (2016–2018). The vertical line is
centered on EUR 750M. We winsorized Consolidated Revenue data since there are enormous difference in the distributional
of the data.

Empirical Results
Regression Discontinuity Analysis
Graphical Presentation
Following Joshi (2020), we start our
analysis with a graphical presentation since
it initially gives visual evidence of any discontinuity in the outcome variable at the
cutoff.12 Figure 1 illustrates the ETR plot
around EUR 750 million cutoff. Before the
implementation of CbCR, there was little to
no discontinuity in ETRs at the threshold
point.
12

The graphs in Figure 1 have been plotted using binned
scatter method (Chetty et al. 2019). As explained Chetty et
al. (2019) we residualize ETR with respect to the UPERev
by CBCR variable. As set out by Starr and Goldfarb
(2020), the residualized binned scatterplot is only rarely

Then, we plot ETR around the EUR
750 million threshold in the post-implementation period as illustrated by Figure 2. In
contrast to Figure 1, the post-implementation period graphs in Figure 2 exhibits a
positive discontinuity in the ETRs at the
EUR 750 million cutoff. These graphs provide initial visual evidence suggesting
lower tax avoidance in ﬁrms subject to
CbCR following disclosure.
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 represent tax behaviour consistent with expectations in the pre-implementation period
reflective of the true, conditional non-parametric
relationship. Notably, if the controls are correlated with the
variable of interest, then the shape of the binned scatterplot
will be in accurate. Therefore, we must residualize to
recover the true relationships.
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Table 5
Univariate Analysis13 of Tax Avoidance

Variables
ETR

250
<EUR 750M
0.2469

250
> EUR 750M
0.2790

450
< EUR 750M
0.2508

450
> EUR 750M
0.2797

550
< EUR 750M
0.2472

550
> EUR 750M
0.2802

This table reports the mean tax avoidance around the EUR 750M threshold in the post-implementation period (2016–2018).
ETR is calculated as total tax expenses divided by pretax income.

Table 6
Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Tax Avoidance
Panel A: Pre-implementation period
BW
250
CBCR (ETR)
0.0122
(0.790)
CBCR (ETR_C)
0.0034
(0.456)
Panel B: Post-implementation period
BW
250
CBCR (ETR)
0.0605*
(0.010)
CBCR (ETR_C)
0.0850*
(0.014)

450
0.0132
(0.801)
0.0099
(0.589)

550
0.0108
(0.772)
0.0068
(0.534)

450
0.0640*
(0.033)
0.0853*
(0.018)

550
0.0647*
(0.038)
0.0834*
(0.011)

Table 6 reports the results of estimating a nonparametric local linear regression using triangle kernel. Panel A reports
the results for the pre-implementation period (2010-2016). CBCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) in 20162019. If consolidated revenue in the preceding year is at least (less than) EUR 750M. 250, 450, 550 bandwidths are
used to estimate the nonparametric regression in the first, second, and third column. The outcome variable in the first
and second row is ETR. ETR is calculated as the total annual tax expense by the pretax income. ETR is reset at 1 and
0. The second row reports the results with the additional covariates (Leverage, Size, and ROA). p-values are reported
in the parentheses and * indicates statistical significance at 0.05.

and furnish initial evidence of a decline in
tax avoidance by treatment ﬁrms in the postimplementation period.
Nonparametric Results
After obtaining the visual evidence of
the discontinuity, we then use nonparametric methods to investigate further the effect
of CbCR on tax avoidance. We first compare the post-implementation mean tax
avoidance for the two groups of firms because a comparison of means is the most
straightforward nonparametric approach
(Joshi 2020). We present the results in
Table 5.
As we can refer, ETR of the treatment
firms is higher compared to the control
firms in all bandwidths. The comparison of
means depicted in Table 5 thus suggests that

tax avoidance is reduced by the time CbCR
was implemented.
To mitigate the bias around the cutoff
inherent to the means comparison test
(Chen et al. 2019), we also utilize a nonparametric regression discontinuity design as
presented by Table 6. CBCR variable is 1
for 2016 and the following years in case
UPE’s consolidated revenue in the
preceding fiscal year was at least EUR 750
million and zero otherwise. We cluster biascorrected standard errors at the ﬁrm level.
The p-value (based on the Z statistics) is
presented in parentheses.
Panel A of Table 6 estimates the regression discontinuity test in the pre-implementation period when there should be no
discontinuity in tax avoidance around the
EUR 750 million threshold. Accordingly,

Univariate analysis is defined as analysis carried out on only one (“uni”) variable (“variate”) to summarize or
describe the variable (Babbie, 2007; Trochim and Donnelly, 2006). Univariate analysis is a relatively simple yet
fundamental type of quantitative analysis used to summarize or describe one variable at a time across cases
(Babbie, 2007; Trochim and Donnelly, 2006).
13
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Table 7
Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Tax Avoidance
Panel A:
Without multivariate
techniques
CBCR*POST
β3
ROA

ETR
reweighting

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.048*
(0,021)

0.044*
(0,032)
0.000
(0,284)
-0.005
(0,457)
-0.0824*
(0,014)

0.045*
(0,030)
0.000
(0,271)
-0.006
(0,450)
-0.081*
(0,015)
0.212*
(0,048)
0.076
(0,357)

√
Firms
930
0.2860

√
Firms
930
0.2887

√
Firms
930
0.2903

0.043*
(0,037)
0.000
(0,306)
-0.007
(0,448)
-0.081*
(0,014)
0.213*
(0,048)
0.069
(0,368)
-0.703
(0,176)
√
Firms
930
0.2910

SIZE
LEVERAGE
INTANG
R&D
AvgSTR
Firm & Year FE
SE Clustered
N
R-sq.

this test serves as a falsiﬁcation or placebo
test to validate the regression discontinuity
design in this setting (Joshi 2020). As we
expected, all columns in Panel A of Table 6
report an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on CBCR.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression discontinuity results for the post-implementation period. The coefﬁcients on
CBCR are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant in all bandwidths. This result is
consistent with Table 5 where treatment
firms generate higher ETRs relative to control ﬁrms and therefore lower tax avoidance. The magnitude of the discontinuity
ranges from 0.0605 to 0.0647.
To improve the accuracy and for comprehensiveness as outlined by Joshi (2020),
we also re-estimate the nonparametric
model by adding several determinants of tax
avoidance, such as total assets, leverage,
and return on assets (Wilde and Wilson
2018). These results are presented in the
second columns of Panel A and B of Table
6. We could infer that adding some determinants of tax avoidance still results in the

Due to the inclusion of ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects.
the CBCR and POST terms are dropped and not
reported in the Table 6.
14

positive coefficient of CBCR and statistically significant in all bandwidths. The coefﬁcients on CBCR are in the magnitude
from 0.0834 to 0.0850. To sum up, Figure 1
and 2 as well as Table 5 and Table 6 collectively provide solid evidence of a decline in
tax avoidance in treatment ﬁrms after the
implementation of CbCR.
Difference-in-Difference Analysis
Table 7 presents the results of the
equation of difference-in-differences analysis using OLS estimation with robust standard error. The coefﬁcient of interest in Table
6 is β3, since it specifies an estimate of the
impact of CbCR on tax avoidance in the
treatment group relative to the control group
in the post-implementation period (Joshi
2020). All columns of Table 6 incorporate
ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effect and standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.14 β3 is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant in most
estimations of Table 7 Panel A showing that
treatment ﬁrms have higher ETR and hence,
lower tax avoidance following the introduction of CbCR relative to control ﬁrms.
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To mitigate the effect of potential bias
arising from non-random treatment assignment on the results in Table 7 Panel A, we
use two multivariate reweighting techniques to enhance the covariate balance between the treatment and the control groups
(Joshi 2020). Panel B of Table 7 presents
the results from the incorporation of entropy
balancing in the equation (columns 1 to 4)
and inverse probability weighting (columns
5 to 8). Comparing between Panel A and
Panel B of Table 7, we could conclude that
coefficient estimates of both panels are similar. These results are therefore robust to
non-random treatment assignment.
The results in Table 7 Panel A and
Panel B provide a solid evidence of an increase in ETRs (or a reduction in tax avoidance) in the treatment ﬁrms relative to the

control ﬁrms after the introduction of CbCR
in Indonesia. Coefﬁcient estimates suggest
that in the post-implementation period, the
ETRs of treatment ﬁrms are 4 to 8 percentage point higher than those of the control
ﬁrms which indicates a decline in tax avoidance.
Using the results of difference-in-differences analysis, we could quantify the
magnitude of CbCR in the firms’ increase
of tax expenses. If we use the mean PTI of
the treatment group of EUR 137.4377 million and impose the coefficient estimates in
Table 7, we will obtain an increase in accounting tax expense of EUR 6 million to
EUR 11 million or IDR 103.2 billion to IDR
192.5 billion for an average treatment
firm.15

15

https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=EUR&d
ate=2020-08-12

Assume the exchange rate of EUR to IDR =
17,463.13 (the EUR-IDR exchange rate on 12
August 2020 based on:
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Table 7- Continued
Panel B: With entropy multivariate reweighting
techniques
CBCR*POST
β3
ROA

ETR-Entropy Balancing
(1)
0.0733*
(0,010)

(2)
0.0793*
(0,006)
-0.0020*
(0,009)
0.1102*
(0,002)
-0.0550
(0,076)

(3)
0.0802*
(0,006)
-0.0020*
(0,009)
0.1097*
(0,002)
-0.0550
(0,078)
0.0265
(0,062)
0.2870
(0,1037)

√
930
0.6925

√
930
0.6976

√
930
0.6977

SIZE
LEVERAGE
INTANG
R&D
AvgSTR
Firm & Year FE
N
R-sq.

ETR-Inverse Probability Weighting
(4)
0.0715*
(0,012)
-0.0022*
(0,006)
0.1081*
(0,002)
-0.0555
(0,073)
0.0327
(0,397)
0.2601
(0,089)
-1.819*
(0,023)
√
930
0.7002

(5)
0.048*
(0,019)

(6)
0.046*
(0,025)
0.000
(0,453)
0.012
(0,408)
-0.077*
(0,037)

(7)
0.0468*
(0,023)
0.000
(0,444)
0.012
(0,413)
-0.075*
(0,041)
0.190
(0,068)
0.049
(0,389)

√
930
0.2883

√
930
0.2899

√
930
0.2909

(8)
0.0448*
(0,028)
0.000
(0,474)
0.012
(0,413)
-0.075*
(0,039)
0.191
(0,068)
0.041
(0,406)
-0.570
(0,231)
√
930
0.2913

This table reports OLS estimates of the following equation:

TAit = α + β1 CBCRit + β2 POSTit + β3 POST x CBCRit + βXit + εit
Where TA is the tax avoidance variable and is measured using ETR. CBCR is an indicator variable equal to (0) 1 in 2010–2019 if the ﬁrm is (not) subject to CbCr rules in 2016–2019. POST is an
indicator variable equal to 1 for all years in which the full CBCR requirements were in effect (2016–2019) and 0 otherwise (2010–2015). Xit is a vector of control variables. Panel B reports OLS
estimates of the equation above adjusted for the weights resulted from entropy balancing exercise and inverse probability weighting. All columns are estimated with firm and year fixed effects.
Due to the inclusion of the year fixed effect. CBCR and POST terms drops from the estimation and as such these terms are not reported in this table. Panel A estimated using White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent diagonal standard errors. p-values are reported in the parentheses and * indicates statistical significance at 0.05.
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Figure 3
Regression Discontinuity Plot of Tax Avoidance
(Pre and Post Implementation Period)
Source: Authors’ Calculation, STATA
Note: Figure 3 plots SBTDs against around the EUR 750M cutoff in the pre-implementation period (2010–
2015) (left figure) and in the post-implementation period (right figure). The vertical line is centered on EUR
750M. We winsorized Consolidated Revenue since there are enormous differences in the distributional of the
data.

Robustness Test
To test the robustness of the analysis
design, we re-estimate the regression discontinuity analysis and difference in difference analysis using the different measurement of tax avoidance. We also re-estimate
the difference in difference analysis baseline model by separating each year before
and after the introduction of CbCR.
Different Measurement of Tax Avoidance
As pointed out by Gebhart (2017),
in accounting and finance empirical studies
there are multiple proxies for corporate tax
avoidance based on two fundamental
measures, viz ETR and book-tax difference
(BTD). Even though Hanlon & Heitzman
(2010) set out that BTD by definition only
capture non-conforming tax avoidance,
they also find out from several discussion of
the sources of BTD that BTD measures are
closely related to ETR measures that is usually used for tax avoidance measure. Following Hanlon (2005) we estimate total
book-tax differences by grossing up current
tax expense by statutory tax rate (25%)16.
Accordingly, BTD is calculated as follows:
Tax Expense
BTD = Pretax Income –
0,25
16

This 25% figure is the statutory corporate tax rate
in Indonesia as referred to in Article 17 of Income
Tax Law

However, as explained by Guenther
(2014), the use of BTD will cause scale
problem where under the same size condition, BTD may be relatively large for a
small firm, and relatively small for a large
firm. To mitigate such problem when using
BTD, following Guenther (2014) we adjust
the number using pretax income as scalar.
Hence, the scaled BTD (SBTD) is computed as follows:
SBTD =

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 –

𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
0,25

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

A higher (positive) SBTD indicates a
higher tax avoidance, and a lower (negative) BTD. suggests a lower tax avoidance.
Figure 3 shows regression discontinuity plot of tax avoidance. As we can examine, the use of BTD as another measurement
tax avoidance measurement provides same
initial evidence of a decline in tax avoidance
by treatment ﬁrms in the post-implementation period. Furthermore, nonparametric results in Table 8 also demonstrate a strong
consistent result using different measurement of tax avoidance. At the post-implementation period, the coefﬁcients on CBCR
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Table 8
Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Tax Avoidance
Panel A: Pre-implementation period
BW
250
450
550
CBCR (SBTD)
0.0773
0.0845
0.0906
(0.762)
(0.787)
(0.805)
CBCR (SBTD_C)
0.1224
0.1158
0.1187
(0.556)
(0.499)
(0.513)
Panel B: Post-implementation period
BW
250
450
550
CBCR (SBTD)
-0.0936*
-0.1030*
-0.0866*
(0.032)
(0.015)
(0.048)
CBCR (SBTD_C)
-0.1300*
-0.1290*
-0.1340*
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.024)
Note: Table 8 reports the results of estimating a nonparametric local linear regression using triangle kernel. Panel A
reports the results for the pre-implementation period (2010-2016). CBCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) in
2016-2019. If consolidated revenue in the preceding year is at least (less than) EUR 750M. 250, 450, 550 bandwidths
are used to estimate the nonparametric regression in the first, second, and third column. The outcome variable in the
first and second row is SBTD. The second row reports the results with the additional covariates (Leverage, Size, and
ROA). p-values are reported in the parentheses and * indicates statistical significance at 0.05.

Table 9
Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Tax Avoidance
Panel A:
Without
multivariate
reweighting techniques
CBCR*POST
β3
ROA

Panel A : Without
multivariate reweighting

BTD
Panel B:
Entropy Balancing

-0.1707*
(0.0416)
-0.0014*
(0.2908)
SIZE
0.0285
(0.4565)
LEVERAGE
0.3227*
(0.0012)
INTANG
-0.8515*
(0.0254)
R&D
-0.2744
(0.3644)
AvgSTR
2.8132
(0.1667)
Firm & Year FE
√
SE Clustered
Firms
N
930
R-sq.
0.2911
This table reports OLS estimates of the following equation:
TAit = α + β1 CBCRit + β2 POSTit + β3 POST x CBCRit + βXit + εit

-0.2872*
(0.012)
0.0091*
(0.006)
-0.4322*
(0.002)
0.2221
(0.073)
-0.1297
(0.398)
-1.0445
(0.087)
7.2904*
(0.022)
√
Firms
930
0.7006

Panel C:
Inverse Probabilty
Weighting
-0.1801*
(0.028)
-0.0002
(0.471)
-0.0473
(0.412)
0.3004*
(0.039)
-0.7634
(0,068)
-0.1733
(0.399)
2.294
(0.230)
√
Firms
930
0.2913

Where TA is the tax avoidance variable and is measured using SBTD. CBCR is an indicator variable equal to (0) 1
in 2010–2019 if the ﬁrm is (not) subject to CbCr rules in 2016–2019. POST is an indicator variable equal to 1 for
all years in which the full CBCR requirements were in effect (2016–2019) and 0 otherwise (2010–2015). Xit is a
vector of control variables. Panel A estimated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent diagonal standard
errors, Panel B reports OLS estimates of the equation above adjusted for the weights resulted from entropy
balancing exercise while Panel C estimates the equation using inverse probability weighting. All columns are
estimated with firm and year fixed effects. Due to the inclusion of the year fixed effect. CBCR and POST terms
drops from the estimation and as such these terms are not reported in this table. p-values are reported in the
parentheses and * indicates statistical significance at 0.05.
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Table 10
Robustness of Difference-in-Difference Model
Yearly Analysis
CBCR_2012
CBCR_2013
CBCR_2014
CBCR_2015
CBCR_2016
CBCR_2017
CBCR_2018
CBCR_2019
Firm & Year FE
N
R-sq.

ETR
(1)
0.0452
(0,1532)
0.0149
(0,368)
0.0759*
(0,0431)
0.1455*
(0,0005)
0.0903*
(0,021)
0.1160*
(0,004)
0.0908*
(0,0200)
0.0829*
(0,0304)
√
930
0.2970

(2)
0.0451
(0,1534)
0.0120
(0,3930)
0.0712
(0,0541)
0.1417*
(0,0007)
0.0843*
(0,029)
0.1099*
(0,007)
0.0850*
(0,0278)
0.0786*
(0,0380)
√
930
0.2990

(3)
0.0423
(0,1698)
0.0127
(0,388)
0.0686
(0,0613)
0.1412*
(0,0008)
0.0844*
(0,0289)
0.1103*
(0,0067)
0.0855*
(0,0275)
0.0785*
(0,039)
√
930
0.3005

(4)
0.0409
(0,1778)
0.0111
(0,401)
0.0664
(0,0678)
0.1388*
(0,0001)
0.0816*
(0,034)
0.1073*
(0,008)
0.0826*
(0,0325)
0.0755*
(0,0455)
√
930
0.3008

This table report OLS estimates of the following equation :
TAit = α + β1 CBCRit + β2 2012 + β3 2013+ β4 2014 + β5 2015 + β6 2016 + β7 2017 + β8 2018 + β9 2019 + β10 CBCRit * 2012+
β11 CBCRit * 2013 + β12 CBCRit * 2014 + β13 CBCRit * 2015 + + β14 CBCRit * 2016 + β15 CBCRit * 2017 + β16 CBCRit *
2018 + β17 CBCRit * 2019 + βXit + FEit + εit
TA is the tax avoidance variable and is measured through ETR. CBCR is indicator variable equal to (0) 1 in 2012–2019 if the
ﬁrm is (not) subject to CbCR rules in 2016–2019. 2012-2019 are indicator variables equal to 1 for year 2012-2019 (respectively)
and 0 otherwise. Xit is a vector of control variables and the coefficients on these terms are omitted for brevity. All columns are
estimated with firm and year fixed effects. Due to the inclusion of the fixed effect. the following estimation and as such are not
reported: CBCR and 2012-2019. Table 7 estimated using original standard errors. p-values are reported in the parentheses and
* indicates statistical significance at 0.05.

are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in
all bandwidths. It shows that there is a decline in tax avoidance by treatment firms in
the post-implementation period. Both results (graphical presentation and nonparametric) bring to a conclusion that either using ETR or BTD as measurement of tax
avoidance gives similar findings.
Same results are also shown in difference in difference analysis. Table 9 exhibits
a persistent result that either using multivariate reweighting techniques or not, treatment ﬁrms have lower BTD and hence,
lower tax avoidance following the introduction of CbCR relative to control ﬁrms.
Robustness of Difference-In-Differences
Model
To obtain robust estimates in difference-in-differences model, the dependent
variable in the treatment and control groups
should follow the same trend (Joshi 2020).
Accordingly, to mitigate concerns that control ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly different ETRs

in the pre-implementation period and to understand the timing of the changes in tax
avoidance, as constructed by Joshi (2020),
we estimate the baseline model as abovementioned by including separate year indicators and interaction variables for four
years before and four years after the introduction of CbCR.
The robustness model is as follows:
TAit = α + β1 CBCRit + β2 2012 + β3
2013+ β4 2014 + β5 2015 + β6 2016 + β7
2017 + β8 2018 + β9 2019 + β10 CBCRit *
2012+ β11 CBCRit * 2013 + β12 CBCRit *
2014 + β13 CBCRit * 2015 + + β14 CBCRit
* 2016 + β15 CBCRit * 2017 + β16 CBCRit
* 2018 + β17 CBCRit * 2019 + βXit + FEit
+ εit
The results of this estimation as reflected in Table 10 suggest that there was no
signiﬁcant difference in tax avoidance in the
two groups of ﬁrms before 2015. However,
commencing in 2015, there is an increase in
the ETRs of the treatment ﬁrms relative to
the control ﬁrms and this effect increases
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over time. Furthermore, a positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the interaction between 2015 and CBCR indicates that there
were some spillover effects of CbCR with
Indonesia MNEs responding before the
ofﬁcial adoption of these regulations, in
2016 and 2017 respectively. This could be
understood considering the public consultation of BEPS Action 13 project has been
performed since early 2014.
The ﬁndings in this section suggest
that the primary results documented in
Table 7 (i.e. the introduction of CbCR led to
a signiﬁcant decline in tax avoidance) are
not driven by an increase in tax avoidance
in the control ﬁrms and can be attributed to
the change in tax behavior of the treatment
ﬁrms.
CONCLUSION
By enacting MoFR-213/2016 and
DGT-29/2017, Indonesia has implemented
BEPS Action 13 on Country-by-Country
Reporting (CbCR). This private disclosure
is expected to provide tax authority with
greater information on the activity of MNEs
wherever they operate, including their tax
payment and several financial indicators
presented on aggregated and jurisdictional
basis. Obtaining incremental insights, tax
authority is expected to increase tax
enforcement, thus decrease corporate tax
avoidance by increasing the cost of
avoidance.
Despite ample research examining
how corporate behavior alters following the
introduction of CbCR requirement as public
disclosure, there is still limited research on
the impact of CbCR as private disclosure.
The only study focusing on the impact of
CbCR as a private disclosure on MNEs tax
behavior is Joshi (2020) which solely focuses on EU headquartered MNEs.
Nevertheless, up until now, there has
not been any study examining the impact of
CbCR requirement as a private tax disclosure on corporate tax behavior in Indonesia.
Considering the nature of Indonesia as a
capital importing country, this study will
complement the research of Joshi (2020) by
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using all MNEs operating in Indonesia, irrespective where the UPEs reside. Accordingly, this research aims to understand the
impact of CbCR as a private disclosure in
Indonesia.
By using regression discontinuity design and difference-in-differences analysis,
as well as separating control group and
treatment group based on the threshold in
BEPS Action 13 (i.e. EUR 750 million cutoff), at the firm level we find a solid evidence of an increase in the effective tax
rates (ETRs) of MNEs operating in Indonesia whose UPEs are subject to CbCR in the
four year of post-adoption period (i.e. 20162019).
This study offers some contributions.
First, we enhance the existing literature by
providing empirical evidence on how a private disclosure requirement could alter the
corporate tax behavior. In this study, we
document a decrease of corporate tax avoidance of the MNEs operating in Indonesia
following the implementation of CbCR as a
private disclosure. Second, this study provides practical implication for the DGT
since it helps in evaluating whether the
adoption of CbCR as mandated by BEPS
Action 13 has achieved the desired results,
i.e. providing transparency and thus lowering the potential of tax avoidance. Considering the result of this study, DGT should
continue the adoption of CbCR requirement
for MNEs in Indonesia so that the information gleaned from CbCR could be used
for tax law enforcement.
However, our study definitely has
some limitations. First, despite having employed difference-in-differences analysis
and the following robustness test, the estimates generated from the analysis might
still be local average treatment effects (Leuz
and Wysocki 2016). Second, this study has
not described through which channel the
CbCR could finally deter tax avoidance,
whether through the increase of enforcement by DGT or through the reputational
costs of potential information leakage that
MNEs face. Furthermore, this study
primarily uses ETR as a proxy to measure

80

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Juni 2020, Vol. 17, No. 1, hal 59-83

corporate tax avoidance and BTD upon
robustness check. It accordingly opens for
further study to use different proxies of tax
avoidance.
Given some limitations above, we
suggest for the use of another estimation
method addressing the issue of local
average treatment effects. Likewise, to test
through which channel the CbCR could
finally deter tax avoidance, we also suggest
the future research to take into account both
tax authority enforcement variable and
reputational costs variable into the equation
as moderating variables.
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein
are those of authors and do not
necessarily represent or reflect the views
of the institution where the authors
worked for or associated with.
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